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Can US afford cost of clean-energy protectionism in race for AI capabilities?_我的网站

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Illustration: Liu Xiangya/GT
Recent media reports have questioned whether a natural gas plant built to power an Amazon data center project in Texas could become the largest climate polluter in the US. The controversy, whatever the eventual outcome, offers a reality check for America's artificial intelligence (AI) drive.
It exposes a growing contradiction: The US is racing to expand its AI capabilities, yet its protectionist trade policies are making it harder and more costly to access some of the clean-energy technologies needed to sustain that expansion. This raises a broader question: Can an energy-intensive AI race afford the costs of renewable energy protectionism?
The US is entering a new era of rising electricity demand. Data centers, the backbone of the AI economy, are emerging as one of the fastest-growing sources of power consumption. Much of that demand is still being met by fossil fuels: The International Energy Agency reports that natural gas supplies more than 40 percent of the electricity used by data centers in the US, making it their largest source of power.
So, it's not surprising that the expansion of data centers has raised concerns over their environmental impact and the pressure they could place on local power systems and electricity bills. A Gallup survey conducted in March found that seven in 10 Americans opposed the construction of AI data centers in their local area, including 48 percent who strongly opposed such projects.
The findings point to a broader challenge for the US: The race to develop AI is increasingly becoming a race to meet growing energy needs. Addressing this challenge will require more than advances in computing technology; it will also depend on an energy system capable of delivering large amounts of reliable, affordable and cleaner power. That, in turn, will require faster development and broader deployment of clean-energy technologies, from solar power to energy storage.
Yet in the clean-energy sector, the US has increasingly relied on protectionist trade measures that limit access to cost-competitive products from global markets. The country has placed greater emphasis on expanding domestic manufacturing capacity, but rebuilding entire clean-energy supply chains at home is a costly and time-consuming process. Even if expanded domestic production is achieved, it is likely to come at a higher cost, making the deployment of renewable technologies more expensive and potentially slower.
The solar industry offers a clear illustration of this policy direction. The US has continued to expand trade barriers in the sector. Reuters reported that the US government announced on Thursday a series of price floors and a 15 percent tariff on products made from polysilicon, a raw material used in solar panels.
The challenge lies in the limited scale of the US polysilicon industry. Reuters reported that the country has two polysilicon factories. Against this backdrop, relying on domestic polysilicon production while restricting access to imports runs counter to the goal of expanding solar power in the US. The country risks creating barriers that ultimately constrain its own access to the global supply chains needed for growth.
The pressing issue for the US is the speed at which new power demand is emerging. The expansion of data centers is creating electricity needs that cannot wait for domestic clean-energy capacity to develop gradually. Global supply chains can provide the scale and speed required in the near term. By narrowing access to these sources, the US risks turning clean-energy policy into a drag on the infrastructure needed for its AI race.
The US has placed AI high on its economic and technological agenda. The outcome of this race will matter greatly, as financial markets are also watching whether America can turn its AI efforts into commercial success.
This leaves the US with a difficult choice: Can it afford the cost of clean-energy protectionism while racing to build AI infrastructure? The answer may be no. Trade barriers that limit access to competitive renewable technologies could ultimately become a constraint on the AI expansion that Washington is seeking to accelerate.
The author is a reporter with the Global Times. [email protected]
。 随着上市公司2026年半年报的不断披露,“牛散”们的持股动向也陆续披露。证券时报记者最新梳理多位知名牛散二季度动向(不排除重名可能性)。

B | 章建平退出两只资源股前十大股东,新进中际旭创第九大股东
中际旭创半年报显示,章建平新进为第九大股东,持有593.48万股。按中际旭创6月30日的收盘价1270元/股计算,章建平的持股市值超过75亿元。

C | 此外,章建平二季度还退出多只个股前十大股东,包括四川黄金、北方稀土、东材科技等。一季度末,章建平曾现身多只资源股前十大股东,除了上述四川黄金、北方稀土,还有西部材料,西部材料目前未披露半年报。 葛卫东坚守两只个股
葛卫东目前仍在坚守江淮汽车、兆易创新。江淮汽车最新半年报显示,葛卫东持有3049.35万股,持股比例1.35%,与一季度末持股比例相同。

D | 兆易创新半年报显示,葛卫东持有1644.67万股,持股比例2.34%,较一季度末的2.32%微幅增加。按兆易创新6月30日的收盘价815元/股计算,葛卫东持股市值超过134亿元。不过兆易创新7月份股价大幅回调,葛卫东若持股不动的话,其持仓市值也会有所变动。 付小铜新进同花顺、北方稀土前十大股东
付小铜2026年一季度因现身中信证券前十大股东引发关注。2026年二季度,付小铜微幅加仓中信证券,同时新进同花顺、北方稀土前十大股东。 中信证券半年报显示,付小铜持有8424.94万股,持股比例0.57%,为第八大股东,按中信证券6月30日的收盘价28.73元/股计算,其持股市值超过24亿元;与一季度末相比,付小铜持股数量微幅增加,持股比例均为0.57%。 同花顺半年报显示,付小铜持有194.89万股,持股比例0.26%,新进第十大股东;按同花顺6月30日收盘价241元/股计算,付小铜持股市值接近5亿元。另外,北方稀土半年报显示,付小铜持有1511.78万股,持股比例0.42%,新进第八大股东;按北方稀土6月30日收盘价48.05元/股计算,付小铜持股市值超过7亿元。 钟格新进多只个股前十大股东 据证券时报记者最新梳理,钟格二季度则新进多只个股前十大股东,包括激智科技、红星发展、祥龙电业、德新科技、富信科技等。

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激智科技半年报显示,钟格持有365.35万股,新进第八大股东。

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红星发展半年报显示,钟格持有1688万股,持股比例4.95%,新进第二大股东;按红星发展6月30日的收盘价62.93元/股计算,钟格持股市值超过10亿元。

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另外,按半年报数据,钟格还持有祥龙电业280万股,持股比例0.75%,新进第十大股东;持有德新科技470万股,持股比例2.02%,新进第三大股东;持有富信科技290万股,持股比例2.53%,新进第三大股东。
总体来看,钟格上述新进个股以中小市值科技股为主,且多为沪市个股。
(文章来源:证券时报)。

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